NASA / Navy Cooperation & Process Based Mission Assurance

NASA / Navy Cooperation & Process Based Mission Assurance Knowledge Management System (PBMA-KMS ) functional support to program and project managers Henry Hartt and Don Vecellio ARES Corporation NASA Office of Safety & Mission Assurance April 5, 2005 H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 1

RATIONALE FOR NASA / NAVY COLLABORATION Notable similarities between human space flight and nuclear submarine programs. Both spacecraft and submarines operate in extreme environments Both require integration of complex systems and subsystems Both must maintain the highest levels of safety and reliability to perform their missions. Navy has continued to operate safely and effectively in resource-constrained and declining production environments. As NASA explores application of nuclear propulsion and power for space exploration, lessons learned from the Navy’s nuclear safety program could be beneficial. Given current management challenges the Agency might benefit from in-depth examination of the engineering management, safety, and mission assurance practices employed by the Navy submarine force. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 2

Initial Areas of Emphasis for NNBE Investigations Assurance Requirements SUBSAFE, Deep Submergence, Nuclear Reactors, Space Shuttle Program Assurance Planning and Analysis Life-Cycle Risk Management: Requirements, Approaches, Tools (e.g., FMEA, Criticality Analysis, PRA, Hazard Analysis, etc.) for Design, Manufacturing, and Operations Assurance Processes Management, Organizational approach (reporting relationships / requirements flow-down), Resource Loading, Engineering, Training Control Processes Work Control, work instructions, configuration management, component/work documentation / pedigree (NAVY SUBSAFE Re-entry Control (REC) Process), Non-conformance disposition, Work review, Surveillance / Inspection, Change Control, Design Change Control, Configuration management Verification Processes Audits: Functional (SUBSAFE Periodic ), NASA Process Verification, NASA NEQA Audit, Certification, Ships: Leave the Shipyard (hull or vehicle) SUBSAFE: Pre-Fast Cruise, Audit, Parts: see REC, Operational Readiness, SUBSAFE: Unrestricted Operations Maintenance Requirements Certification (URO-MRC), Space Shuttle Certification of Flight Readiness Process H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 3

Navy Organizations Visited by NASA NAVSEA (Naval Sea Systems Command) HQ / WNY NAVSEA 07 (SUBSAFE Program) NAVSEA 08 (Naval Reactors) NAVSEA 05 (Ship Design Integration and Engineering) SUPSHIP (Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair) Portsmouth Naval Shipyard – SUBMEPP (Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning and Procurement) – NAVSEALOGCEN (NAVSEA Logistics Center) – SHAPEC (Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center ) Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard & Integrated Maintenance Facility – SUBSAFE Functional Audit General Dynamics Electric Boat Division Bath Iron Works H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 4

Navy Strengths Rigor of SUBSAFE Safety Assurance Process NAVSEA 08 religious assignment of lifecycle assurance responsibility – Emphasis on “Minority Opinion” in the Decision Process – Emphasis on Recurrent Training NAVSEA Warrants – Independent Technical Authority PDREP/RYG processes of maintaining a record of contractor/supplier Quality Assurance (QA) performance H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 5

NASA/NAVY Memoranda of Agreement NASA / NAVSEALOGCENDET Portsmouth NASA / NAVSEA 07 Supplier QA Information Exchange Audit Participation NASA / NAVSEA 05 Engineering Investigations and Analyses H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 6

Navy Approaches Infused into NASA Processes NAVSEA SUBSAFE and Nuclear Reactor training led to Safety Critical Decision Making (CSDM) training initiative implemented by Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) SUBSAFE Audits Model adapted to NASA Programmatic Audit and Review Process Ongoing collaboration in Human Factors and Software development IV&V Pyramidal (three point) decision process (Technical, Program, Safety) adapted by NASA ITA Technical Warrant Holders process established by OCE Establishment of NESC Creation of OSMA Review and Assessment Division H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 7

Summary Reports Published December 20, 2002 -- Report 1 : “Navy Submarine Program Safety Assurance” July 15, 2003 -- Report 2: “Naval Nuclear Submarine Safety Assurance” October 22, 2004 -- “Ongoing NNBE Activities & Software Subgroup Report I” http://pbma.nasa.gov/program/nnbe.htm H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 8

Safety Cultural Emphasis "The only way to operate a nuclear power plant and indeed a nuclear industry -- the only way to ensure safe operation, generation after generation, as we have -- is to establish a system that ingrains in each person a total commitment to safety: a pervasive, enduring devotion to a culture of safety and environmental stewardship." ADM F.L. BOWMAN H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 9

“RESPONSIBILITY IS A UNIQUE CONCEPT" It can only reside and inhere in a single individual. You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you. You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it. Even if you do not recognize it or admit its presence, you cannot escape it. If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance, or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else. Unless you can point your finger at the man who is responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible. ADM H.G. RICKOVER H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 10

Process Based Mission Assurance Knowledge Management System (PBMA-KMS ) functional support to program and project managers H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 11

Background PBMA-KMS deployed in March of 2001 is the first fully operational NASA-wide multifunctional Knowledge Management System Developed and implemented under the sponsorship of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Merged existing NASA SMA program/project life-cycle “knowledge architecture” with state-of-the-art KM concepts presented in GWU/KM graduate coursework PBMA Knowledge Architecture reflects integration of SMA functions (work processes) into the systems engineering program/project life-cycle Maintaining ongoing dialogue with KM community at GWU, GMU, Washington KM Roundtable, KM-Pro / Universal KM Framework Workshop PBMA-KMS serves program/project managers and safety and mission assurance professionals within a traditional life-cycle work breakdown context: Widely accessible / user friendly / content rich In place: policies & requirements, best practices, lessons learned, tacit knowledge capture (video nuggets), collaborative tools, etc. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 12

PBMA-KMS Timeline Requirements 7120.5 8x5 Lifecycle Matrix (Plan, Do, Check) Program Profiles Best Practices Lessons Learned Tutorial Knowledge Capture NIST/Section 508 Compliance Video Nuggets Collaborative Environment Road Shows CoP Workshops Knowledge Registry 2810 Compliance CAIB/CTF Support Enhanced Security Work Groups SecureMeeting PM NASA Transformation: PBMA PM / ITA / ICV Support ITA ICV Knowledge Sharing Knowledge Protection Milestones Concept Development 1998 1999 Deployment 2000 Operational 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Content Block Updates Center Rollouts / CoP Workshops Call for Best Practices PM Knowledge Registry ITA Administrator’s Award for Excellence Awards Work Group Members (x 100) Standard Security Enhanced Security Unique Visitors per Month (500 2100) Other PBMA-KMS Statistics: 230 Best Practices; 260 Video Nuggets 1300 Links to Gov’t & Industry LL & Standards 180 NASA Programs / Projects Supported H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 Total Work Groups Metrics ICV HQ PBMA-KMS Team Award 250 250 200K 200 200 160K 150 150 140K 100 100 80K 50 50 40K 00 0 Oct Oct 2001 2002 2001 2002 http://pbma.nasa.gov Oct 2003 2003 Oct 2004 2004 PBMA Hits per Month Page Views per Month New Functionality / Support PBMA 13

PBMA-KMS Work Groups/Communities of Practice Glenn Sotware Engineering Process Group Over 7200 work group members More than 340 individual communities of practice Volume: More people are coming to PBMA, they are using the site for longer, and they are coming back again for more information. 190,000 hits per month (an increase of over 20% from the beginning of 2004). Return Visits: numbers of daily visitors and returning visitors (key indicators of value) have increased more than 25% during the last 12 months. Length of Visit: most telling indication of value is the length of visit. Visitors are spending 45% more time at PBMA then they were at the beginning of 2004. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 38 Communities of Practice supporting the Space Shuttle Program return-to-flight efforts. 145 other NASA programs and projects also supported 14

PBMA - Knowledge Architecture Formulation Project Phase Elements Policies Pgm Mgmt Concept Devel. Implementation Acq. HW SW Mfg Integ. Test Ops 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 1.2 2.2 3.2 4.2 5.2 6.2 7.2 8.2 1.3 2.3 3.3 4.3 5.3 6.3 7.3 8.3 1.4 2.4 3.4 4.4 5.4 6.4 7.4 8.4 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5 (Rules & Req.) Plans Processes Controls Verification H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 1.5 2.5 Each cell contains video-nuggets, text, links http://pbma.nasa.gov 15

KM Functional “Utilities” The PBMA-KMS employs a core set of KM functionalities that have the potential to serve all users. These are "no-brainer" functional requirements (i.e., the gas, water, electricity and cable TV of knowledge management) applicable/available to every unique knowledge management system and architecture. Individual Business Units with Unique Knowledge Architectures lM cia n a Fin t gm Safety and Mission Assurance Dee p Pro Spac gra e ms Business Unit-Specific Knowledge Architectures Document Repository Advanced Search / Discovery (across public domains) Secure Communities of Practice (Work Groups) Secure Web Meetings Knowledge Registry (expert finder) Agency/Enterprise-wide KM Utilities H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 16

Selected PBMA Functionality Framework Mode – Knowledge Architecture – Video Nuggets (a verbal corporate/tacit knowledge archive) Standard Security Work Groups – Web-based collaborative environment (CE) tool for public domain information Enhanced Security Work Groups – Secure Web-based CE Tool for sensitive information Knowledge Registry – Web-based repository for SMA/engineering/technical expertise Secure Web Meeting – Secure, real-time “white-board” tool for sharing information and conducting meetings remotely via the Internet (secure uplinks/downlinks and servers) H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 17

Functional Tabs (operational modes) Video “Nuggets” H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 18

Standard Security Work Groups and Communities of Practice COTS Web-hosted Product – Industry Best Practice – Password protected / NPR 2810.1 compliant – No ITAR / EAR or other Sensitive Data Document Sharing and Management, Calendars, Action Tracking, Announcements, Polls, Contacts, Links, Threaded Discussions, etc. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 19

Enhanced Security Work Groups and Communities of Practice Developed in Partnership with GRC-CIO/IT Security One-factor strong authentication 128-bit SSL encryption Designed to Support Sensitive Information Management and Exchange ITAR / Export Controlled Information Source Evaluation Boards and Competition Sensitive Information Mishap Investigation Information H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 Provides a means of establishing a secure, accessible site for team collaboration when Administratively Controlled Information (ACI) is involved http://pbma.nasa.gov 20

PBMA Knowledge Registry Locate/Contact Experts Identifies where Agency S&MA, Engineering, and Technology expertise and knowledge resides Voluntary Registration Linked to NASA Competency Management System (CMS) Allows users to locate specific subject matter experts in a fast, convenient mechanism Searchable by selected (e.g., “.mil”, “.nasa”, “.gov”) domains Can assist in Resource Management & Planning Activities Currently supporting NASA / NAVSEA expert collaboration H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 21

Secure Web Meeting Reduced travel Schedule on your own, no dial-in numbers Easy access; plug-and-play appliance with no recurring costs Real time collaboration Remote “white-board” collaboration in a secure environment Protected Transient Events – 128-bit encryption Implemented on a NASA Server behind NASA’s firewall Operates with standard Web browsers Does not require similar software on attendees’ PCs Easy client setup: install or download it “on-the-fly” on first use Host a "shared desktop" session over the Internet Capable of holding 10 meetings with 50 people in each – simultaneously Share any document, briefing, spreadsheet, etc. between multiple users Pass control of the meeting among attendees Make changes in real-time Built-in meeting scheduling and user invitation H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 22

BACKUP CHARTS H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 23

Potential Opportunities (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #1) Requirements & Compliance Opportunity Description Rationale / Value 1.1 Functional Safety Requirements for Future Human Rated Space Systems Enhance current NASA efforts to develop corporate- level human rating functional design requirements by adding the NAVSEA evolutionary (successive ship class specification) dimension. Establishes a clear, executable requirements baseline for future human rated space systems 1.2 NAVSEA Model for Compliance Verification Organization Establish, for human rated space systems, a centrally controlled and separately funded independent safety compliance organization to verify the implementing organization’s functional capabilities, and to verify compliance with the program /project baseline safety and mission assurance requirements. Approach creates a clearly independent, unambiguous compliance assurance organization. 1.3 Compliance Verification for new NASA Human Rated Programs Review current NASA planning versus NAVSEA approaches for compliance verification to be employed for the Orbital Space Plane program and potential future nuclear propulsion programs. Assures that contract surveillance and compliance verification methods have a scope and rigor consistent with the goal of mitigating manageable risks in human space flight systems. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 24

Potential Opportunities (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #1) Lessons Learned & Knowledge Retention Opportunity Description Rationale / Value 2.1 Lessons Learned Management at NASA Move forward with current NASA planning to implement an aggressive NASA lessons learned/knowledge management initiative, under the leadership of the NASA Chief Engineer. Using NAVSEA “template” combine continuous learning with technical authority roles. Facilitates requirements development for future NASA space and aeronautical systems. Enables programs to avoid past mistakes. Provides for centralized management and ownership of lessons learned within the engineering management/systems engineering organization. 2.2 Lessons Learned Training Explore the possibility of developing safety/mission success lessons learned training courses for small groups of trainees based on noted NASA failures including the Challenger (STS 51L) loss, the 1967 Apollo 1 (Apollo 204) fire, 1970 Apollo 13 mishap, the 1986 (manufactured) Hubble Space Telescope mirror incident, and the more recent Lewis Spacecraft, Mars Climate Orbiter, and Mars Polar Lander mishaps. Provides motivation and reinforces safety culture and discipline within NASA workforce. Provides greater understanding of failures in tightly coupled, complex system. Reinforces the need to address all areas of potential critical failure. 2.3 Knowledge Retention (FTE Ceiling Authorization for Hiring) Obtain approval to increase its hiring ceiling (not its overall budget) allowing the flexibility to hire young engineers while retaining the experienced engineers necessary to mentor and provide essential knowledge transfer. Provides means to retain corporate knowledge. Enables mentoring of new employees. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 25

Potential Opportunities (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #1) Process Improvement Opportunity Description Rationale / Value 3.1 NAVSEA Logistic Center Leverage the extensive vendor quality history database available at the NAVSEA Logistics Center to assist in supplier selection and evaluation. Assists in selecting qualified, proven suppliers and vendors. 3.2: Software Contracting Approach Review future software contract language and structure to insure an appropriate level of specification detail and implementation assurance consistent with the NAVSEA approach. Ensures that appropriate software assurance processes are implemented throughout the software development life-cycle. 3.3: Human Factors Collaborate with NAVSEA 03 to develop possible human/system interface technical standards, policies, and processes for NASA. Evaluate how mission goals, function analysis, task analysis, and maintenance/operation tasks were developed and modeled in the VIRGINIA Class. Provides the opportunity for NASA and Navy to exchange lessons learned as each organization moves to provide additional focus on human factors in system program/project life cycle. 3.4: Tools/ Quantitative Methods Improve NASA databases containing historic reliability and operational performance data, by centralizing information into an Agency risk and reliability database. Enables use of historic reliability and operational performance data, to support design and risk assessment teams H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 26

NR Key Organizational Observations (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 ) Total programmatic and safety responsibility for all aspects of design, fabrication, training, test, installation, operation, and maintenance of all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion activities. Flat organization with quick and assured access to the Director – about 40 direct reports from within HQ, the field offices, and prime contractors. Communications between headquarters and prime contractors and shipyard personnel occurs frequently at many levels, and a cognizant engineer at a prime or shipyard may talk directly with the cognizant headquarters engineer, as necessary. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) is a very stable program based on long-term relationships with three prime contractors and a relatively small number of critical suppliers and vendors. NR embeds safety and quality process within its organization; i.e., the “desired state” of an organization completely mainstreams safety and quality assurance . Reliance on highly qualified, highly trained people who personally accountable and responsible for safety. Recurrent training a major element of safety culture. NR incorporates extensive outside experience (Challenger, Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Army SL-1 reactor) into a safety training regimen that has become a major component of the NR safety record – 128,000,000 miles of safe travel using nuclear propulsion. NR promotes the airing of differing opinions. Even with an absence of differing opinions, management is responsible to ensure critical examination of an issue. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 27

NR Safety Observations (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 ) NR has an institutionally embedded closed-loop process that begins with a technical requirements base built on lessons learned from more than 5,400 reactor years of experience, which in turn represents the foundation for the next-generation propulsion plant design specifications. There is no single (stand-alone) document that prescribes NR design safety criteria or standards. Safety requirements are embedded in a uniform set of technical requirements. NR has a rigorous change control process that enforces review and concurrence of each recommended change by all stakeholders. Managing change is frequently discussed at senior levels. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 28

NR Implementation Observations (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 ) Each independent lab general manager is required to be technically competent and is directly responsible for the safety of the reactors and facilities under his/her cognizance. The NR Director exercises (by law) direct supervision over the laboratories. Review by Quality Assurance or Safety does not diminish responsibility of line organization for program/product safety. There is no separate systems engineering group or a job category of “systems engineer” within NR. While no single individual serves as system safety engineer or integrator, there is an individual (Reactor Safety and Analysis Director) responsible for maintaining an overall design safety perspective. Responsibility for safety of an action remains with the authoring engineer and his Section Heads. The Reactor Safety and Analysis Section reviews, consults and concurs in decisions on product nuclear safety aspects, but responsibility for product safety remains with the cognizant engineer and engineering organization. The Reactor Safety and Analysis Section has an independent and equal voice in design and operational decisions. Evolutionary application of more than 50 years Lessons Learned to each program reduces operational risk and uncertainty. “Freedom to Dissent” is a primary element within NR. Systemic emphasis on recruiting, training, and retaining the “very best people” for their entire careers. Critical self-evaluation of problems with strong Headquarters oversight isolates and controls the small problems before they escalate into large problems. Closed loop corrective action is mandatory. Problems must be identified, analyzed, and resolved and their resolutions proven successful. Cause analysis is performed via a formal fact-gathering critique, supplemented by expert assessment of root cause/corrective actions. Heavy emphasis placed on reactor design ergonomics through the use of methods, such as interactive visualization techniques, walk-throughs, and discussions with operators. Operational human factors are emphasized; but change for the sake of change is not permitted. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 29

NR Compliance Verification Observations (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 ) Emphasis on “Silver Bullet Thinking is Dangerous” -- "there is no silver bullet tool or technique.” All elements of quality assurance and compliance assurance must be rigorously implemented to ensure delivery and operation of safe, reliable, and high quality systems. Audit teams include the requirement owner (technical authority) for a particular area. Owner participates in the audit process to acquire first-hand understanding of how technical requirements are (or are not) being implemented. NR field offices act as day-to-day audit and inspection groups. Responses to their findings are required, and they must approve final actions in response to major comments. Functional audits of shipyards supplemented by field office assessments and comparative evaluations of the site’s own self-assessments. Qualification and biennial re-qualification of all nuclear operators by written examination and oral board examination assures currency of skills. In addition, the NPEB administers an annual examination to the entire engineering department of a ship and reports results to the ship’s CO, the command authority for that ship, and NR Headquarters. DCMA is used, but is given technical direction by NR directly rather than by DCMA HQ. NR has Process Sponsor Program where engineering activity retains technical responsibility for its components but consults with process experts (sponsors) within their identified areas of responsibility, as necessary. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 30

NR Key Certification Observations (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #2 ) NR performs incremental audits (similar to SUBSAFE) prior to key events to evaluate critical processes and to correct any problems with work accomplishment or critical documentation. A seven-phase test program begins with visual check of installation and progresses through higher levels of detail to actual operation of the reactor and delivery of power to assure readiness of the reactor plant for sea trials. A Joint Test Group (JTG), composed of representatives from the construction shipyard, NRRO, Ship’s Force, and the cognizant laboratory, reviews and approves the administration and performance of test documents and acceptance of test results. H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 31

Software Assurance Opportunities for NASA (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #3 ) 1. Reappraise Shuttle software using CMM or CMMI – 2. NASA may want to consider reappraising Shuttle on both the contractor and civil servant sides using CMM or CMMI to verify that their exemplary rigor has not diminished. This is especially important since the Shuttle is still certified at CMM Level 5 despite not having been appraised in 8 years, during which time it has changed contractors twice. Strengthen the levels of defense for assuring software safety – NASA may want to consider strengthening its levels of defense for assuring software safety and quality. Specifically, this opportunity includes establishing and implementing better contractor requirements (Level 1), bolstering the Agency’s Software Assurance (SA) resource pool (Level 2), and ensuring that IV&V is called upon only in critical situations (Level 3). H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 http://pbma.nasa.gov 32

Software Assurance Opportunities for NASA (NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange Interim Report #3 ) 3. Strengthen Agency CMM/CMMI related requirements for mission critical software. – When updating NPD 2820, NASA Software Polices, NASA may want to consider not only keeping, but potentially strengthening, the CMM/CMMI related requirements for organizations developing or maintaining mission critical software. Some of this work has already been initiated in NASA SWE NPR 7150.2 (Software Engineering Requirements), which was in the administrative review cycle at the time of this report. 4. Institute Agency-wide software inspection efforts. – H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 The use of rigorous formal software inspections, developed based on industry best practices such as those prescribed by Fagan and Gilb, has provided positive lessons learned for NASA. NASA is considering instituting an Agencywide effort to re-infuse these, or similar inspection processes, into all software intensive projects. http://pbma.nasa.gov 33

GLOSSARY ACI Administratively Controlled Information CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board CE Collaborative Environment CIO/IT Chief Information Officer/Information Technology CMS Competency Management system CoP Community of Practice COTS Commercial Off The Shelf DCMA Defense Contract Management Administration EAR Export Administration Regulations FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis GRC Glenn Research Center MRC Maintenance Requirement Card GWU George Washington University GMU George Mason University ICV Independent ITA Independent Technical Authority ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations JTG Joint Test Group KM Knowledge Management NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command NAVSEA 05 Ship Design, Integration and Engineering NAVSEA 08 Naval Reactors NAVSEALOGCEN NAVSEA Logistics Center NESC NASA Engineering Safety Center NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NNBE NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange H Hartt / D Vecellio April 3, 2005 NPEB NR NRRO OCE PDREP PBMA-KMS PM PRA REC RYG SA SHAPEC SUBMEPP SUBSAFE SUPSHIP SWE URO WNY http://pbma.nasa.gov Naval Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board NAVSEA 08 Naval Reactors Naval Reactors Representative Office Objective Quality Evidence Product Data Reporting and Evaluation Program Process Based Mission Assurance – Knowledge Management System Program Manager Probabilistic Risk Assessment Re-entry Control Red/Yellow/Green contractor evaluation process Software Assurance Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning and Procurement Submarine Safety Program Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair Software Engineering Unrestricted Operations Washington Navy Yard 34