E-mail Security –PGP and S/MIME Certificates and PKI

E-mail Security –PGP and S/MIME Certificates and PKI

E-mail Security E-mail is one of the most widely used network services – killer application of the Internet Normally message contents not secured – Can be read/modified either in transit or at destination by the attacker E-mail service is like postcard service – just pick it and read it

Email Security Enhancements confidentiality – protection from disclosure authentication – of sender of message message integrity – protection from modification non-repudiation of origin – protection from denial by sender

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) widely used secure e-mail software – originally a file encryption/decryption facility developed by Phil Zimmermann – a security activist who has had legal problems due to PGP best available crypto algorithms are employed available on several platform with source code originally free, now commercial versions exist not controlled by a standardization body – although there are RFCs

PGP Mechanisms Digital Signatures (and consequently message authentication and integrity) – RSA, DSS Message Encryption – CAST, IDEA, 3DES (all at least 128 bits) – symmetric keys are used once and encrypted using RSA or ElGamal (based on discrete logs) Compression using ZIP Radix-64 conversion (to ASCII) – for e-mail compatibility

PGP Operation – Digital Signatures Classical application of public key crypto This figure is actually for RSA for DSA refer to previous lectures Z is zip function radix-64 conversion is done after zip at sender, before Z-1 at receiver may be done only for signature or for the whole message

PGP Operation – Confidentiality E[PUb, Ks] One-time session key, Ks – generated at random – encrypted using a public key cryptosystem, EP RSA or ElGamal Message is compressed before encryption – This is the default case

PGP Operation – Confidentiality and Authentication uses both services on same message – – – – create signature and attach to message compress and encrypt both message & signature attach encrypted session key radix-64 conversion is for everything at the end

PGP Operation – radix-64 conversion Encrypted text and signatures create binary output however email was designed only for text – hence PGP must encode raw binary data into printable ASCII characters uses radix-64 algorithm (See appendix 15b) – maps 3 bytes to 4 printable chars

PGP Operation – Summary

PGP Key ID concept since a user may have many public/private keys in use, there is a need to identify which is actually used to encrypt session key in a message – PGP uses a key identifier which is least significant 64-bits of the public key – uniqueness? very likely, at least for a particular user ID (e-mail address) Key IDs are used in signatures too – key ID for the public key corresponding to the private key used for signature Key IDs are sent together with messages

PGP Key Rings each PGP user has a pair of keyrings to store public and private keys – public-key ring contains all the public-keys of other PGP users known to this user

PGP Key Rings private-key ring contains the public/private key pair(s) for this user, private keys are encrypted using a key derived from a hashed passphrase

Key rings and message generation

Key rings and message reception

PGP Key Management - 1 From PGP documentation: “This whole business of protecting public keys from tampering is the most difficult problem in practical public key applications” You have to make sure about the legitimacy of the public key of your party – exchange public-keys manually (using CDs, etc.) – verify fingerprint of a public key over the phone – trust another individual who signs public keys public key signatures

PGP Key Management - 2 Public keys could be signed by – Certification Authorities (CA) trusted entities the mechanism of S/MIME, not in PGP – in PGP each user is a CA everybody can sign keys of users they know directly other users’ key signatures can also be used, if those users are trusted The only ultimately trusted entity is yourself – all other keys should either be directly signed by you or there should be a trusted path of key signatures – you reflect your own trust assessment in your public key ring (no system enforcement) – key ring includes trust indicators – “web of trust”

PGP Key Management - 3 A trusted signature on a public key means that – the key really belongs to its owner But does not mean that key owner is trusted to sign other keys – key owner can sign other keys, but their trustworthiness is determined by the verifier (the owner of the pubkey ring) Making sure about the legitimacy of a key and trusting the key owner to find out other keys are two different concepts Keys and signatures on them are generally obtained from PGP public keyservers – there might be several signatures on a single key

PGP Key Management - 4 A public key ring owned by “you” These are assigned by you This is calculated

S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions A standard way for email encryption and signing IETF effort (RFCs 2632, 2633 – for version 3.0; RFCs 3580, 3581 for version 3.1) Industry support Not a standalone software, a system that is to be supported by email clients – such as MS Outlook and Thunderbird S/MIME handles digital signatures – Also provides encryption

Quick E-mail History SMTP and RFC 822 – only ASCII messages (7-bit) MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) – content type Almost any of information can appear in an email message – transfer encoding specifies how the message body is encoded into textual form (radix64 is common) S/MIME: Secure MIME – new content types, like signature, encrypted data

S/MIME Functions enveloped data – encrypted content and associated keys signed data – encoded message encoded signed message digest clear-signed data – cleartext message encoded signed message digest signed and enveloped data – Nested signed and encrypted entities

S/MIME Cryptographic Algorithms hash functions: SHA-1 & MD5 digital signatures: DSS & RSA session key encryption: ElGamal & RSA message encryption: Triple-DES, RC2/40 and others sender should know the capabilities of the receiving entity (public announcement or previously received messages from receiver) – otherwise sender takes a risk

Scope of S/MIME Security S/MIME secures a MIME entity – a MIME entity is entire message except the headers – so the header is not secured First MIME message is prepared This message and other security related data (algorithm identifiers, certificates, etc.) are processed by S/MIME and packed as one of the S/MIME content type

S/MIME Content Types

EnvelopedData For message encryption Similar to PGP – create a random session key, encrypt the message with that key and a conventional crypto, encrypt the session key with recipient’s public key Unlike PGP, recipient’s public key comes from an X.509 certificate – trust management is different

SignedData For signed message – both message and signature are encoded so that the recipient only sees some ASCII characters if he does not use an email client with S/MIME support Similar to PGP – first message is hashed, then the hash is encrypted using sender’s private key Message, signature, identifiers of algorithms and the sender’s certificate are packed together – again difference between S/MIME and PGP in trust management

Clear Signing Another mechanism for signature – but the message is not encoded, so an email client with no S/MIME support could also view the message of course the signature will not be verified and will be seen as a meaningless attachment multipart/signed content type – 2 parts Clear text message Signature – Let’s see an example

S/MIME Certificate Processing S/MIME uses X.509 v3 certificates – Certification Authorities (CAs) issue certificates – unlike PGP, a user cannot be a CA each client has a list of trusted CA’s certificates – actually that list comes with e-mail client software or OS and own public/private key pairs and certs Our textbook says “S/MIME key management is a hybrid of a strict X.509 CA hierarchy and PGP’s web of trust” – but I do not believe that this is the case, because it is very hard for an average user to maintain the list of trusted CAs

S/MIME Certificate Processing and CAs One should obtain a certificate from a CA in order to send signed messages Certificates classes (common practice by most CAs) – Class 1 – Class 2 – Class 3 Stronger identity validation Easier to issue CA certification policies (Certificate Practice Statement) – ID-control practices Class 1: only email address check Class 2: class1 against third party database / fax documents Class 3: class1 apply in person and submit picture IDs and/or paper documents

X.509 Certificates and PKIs SSL and S/MIME uses X.509 certificates – now we will see the details of them – later we will continue with PKIs (Public Key Infrastructures)

Certificates Yet another public-key distribution method – first (conceptually) offered by Kohnfelder (1978) Binding between the public-key and its owner Issued (digitally signed) by the Certificate Authority (CA)

Certificates Certificates are verified by the verifiers to find out correct public key of the target entity Certificate verification is the verification of the signature on certificate In order to verify a certificate, the verifier – must know the public key of the CA – must trust the CA

Certificates CA Certified Entity Albert Levi Albert Levi Albert Levi Verifier

Issues Related Certificates CA certification policies (Certificate Practice Statement) – how reliable is the CA? – certification policies describe the methodology of certificate issuance – ID-control practices loose control: only email address tight control: apply in person and submit picture IDs and/or hard documentation

Issues Related Certificates TRUST – verifiers must trust CAs – CAs need not trust the certified entities – certified entity need not trust its CA What is “trust” in certification systems? – Answer to the question: “How correct is the certificate information?” – related to certification policies

Issues Related Certificates Certificate types – ID certificates discussed here – authorization certificates no identity binding between public key and authorization info Certificate storage and distribution – along with a signed message – distributed/centralized databases

Issues Related Certificates Certificate Revocation – certificates have lifetimes, but they may be revoked before the expiration time – Reasons: certificate holder key compromise/lost CA key compromise end of contract (e.g. certificates for employees) – Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) hold the list of certificates that are not expired but revoked each CA periodically issues such a list with digital signature on it

Real World Analogies Is a certificate an “electronic identity”? Concerns – a certificate is a binding between an identity and a key, not a binding between an identity and a real person – one must submit its certificate to identify itself, but submission is not sufficient, the key must be used in a protocol – anyone can submit someone else’s certificate

Real World Analogies Result: Certificates are not picture IDs So, what is the real world analogy for certificates? – Endorsed document/card that serves as a binding between the identity and signature

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) PKI is a complete system and welldefined mechanisms for certificates – certificate issuance – certificate revocation – certificate storage – certificate distribution

PKI Business Practice: Issue certificates and make money – several CAs Several CAs are also necessary due to political, geographical and trust reasons 3 interconnection models – hierarchical – cross certificates – hybrid

Hierarchical PKI Example Root CA Upper level CAs CAs End users

Cross Certificate Based PKI Example CAs End users Cross certificates

Hybrid PKI example

Certificate Paths

Certificate Paths Verifier must know public key of the first CA Other public keys are found out one by one All CAs on the path must be trusted by the verifier

Certificate Paths with Reverse Certificates Reverse certificates

Organization-wide PKI Local PKI for organizations – may have global connections, but the registration facilities remain local – generally to solve local problems local secure access to resources

Organization-wide PKI PKI Server Certificate Processor/Authority CP (CA) Databases / Directories Administration Registration Authority CD RA PKI Client Architecture of a typical organization-wide PKI Certificate Distribution

Hosted vs. Standalone PKI Hosted PKI – PKI vendor acts as CA – PKI owner is the RA Standalone PKI – PKI owner is both RA and CA

Hosted vs. Standalone PKI Advantages of hosted PKI over standalone PKI Standalone PKI Hosted PKI Organization has to have a secure server Organization does not need to run a secure for certificate issuance and processing. server for certificate processing. Organization must issue cross certificates PKI provider (host) already has such or has to have some other arrangements for arrangements. Organization does not have universal connection of its PKI. Otherwise, to worry about worldwide visibility of its the PKI remains local. PKI. More administrative work for organization. Less administrative work for organization. Disadvantages of hosted PKI over standalone PKI Standalone PKI Hosted PKI No continuous dependency on the PKI Continuous dependency on the PKI vendor vendor. Organization does not have to pay (host). The organization must pay regular periodic fees. fees to the host based on the certificate volume. Security of the PKI is in the organization’s Although the organization is responsible hands. for the security of its PKI, they are dependent on the host’s security. Organization does not have to trust the PKI Ultimate trust to host is indispensable. vendor as different than its other software vendors. The only user of the private key is the Private key is being used by the host for organization itself. certificate issuance.

X.509 ITU-T standard (recommendation) – ISO 9495-2 is the equivalent ISO standard part of X.500 family for “directory services” – distributed set of servers that store user information an utopia that has never been carried out – X.509 defines the authentication services and the pubic-key certificate structure (certificates are to be stored in the directory) – so that the directory would contain public keys of the users

X.509 Defines identity certificates – attribute (authorization) certificates are added in 4th edition (2000) Defines certificate structure, not PKI Supports both hierarchical model and cross certificates End users cannot be CAs

X.509 Certificate Format

X.509v3 Extensions Not enough flexibility in X.509 v1 and v2 – mostly due to “directory” specific fields – real-world security needs are different email/URL names should be included in a certificate key identification was missing (so should be included) policy details should indicate under which conditions a certificate can be used (was not the case in v1 and v2) avoidance of blind trust was not possible in v1 and v2 Rather than explicitly naming new fields a general extension method is defined – An extension consists of an extension identifier, value and criticality indicator

X.509v3 Extensions Key and policy information – subject & issuer key identifiers – indicators of certificate policies supported by the cert – key usage (list of purposes like signature, encryption, etc) Alternative names, in alternative formats for certificate subject and issuer Certificate path constraints – For CA certs and to restrict certificate issuance based on path length (restricting number of subordinate CAs) policy identifiers names Verifier could exercise its own restrictions during verification as well – No blind trust to CAs